North Korea has long been an international concern, not only for the United States, but also for its allies in the Pacific region.1 These concerns have been elevated in recent years with North Korea’s intentions to become a nuclear power and subsequent rounds of testing.2 Most of the recent international focus has been spent attempting to curb North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, yet, there has been little response addressing its human rights issues and the generations-long atrocities against the North Korean people by its rulers. 3 The extent of the atrocities were exposed in 2014, when the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) released a report outlining the lack of human rights in North Korea and noting that “crimes against humanity” (CAH) had been committed.4 The same evidence indicates North Korean leadership has also committed genocidal and democidal acts. Democide, a fairly new term, is “[t]he murder of any person or people by a government, including genocide, politicide, and mass murder.” 5 Given the historical and current treatment of North Korean citizens by its government, this phrase would adequately define those atrocities. 6 Yet, does it matter if North Korean leadership is committing genocide, democide, or “crimes against humanity,” and if it does, what should be the international response under current international law? No matter what the international response, there are no good options. The international community could choose to do nothing and maintain the status quo, or it could rely on international law to properly address the crimes against humanity (CAH) committed by North Korean leadership. The international community could also use military action to end the crimes against humanity. All options have serious flaws.

The first two parts of this Article will present some brief background information about North Korea, some of the findings of the UNHRC’s Commission of inquiry on human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (“the Commission”), how those findings fit into the definitions of genocide, democide, and CAH, and why North Korean leadership should be charged with CAH. However, charging is only part of the equation. The third part of this Article will explore why relying on international law to end the North Korean CAH, particularly relying on the International Criminal Court (ICC) and Universal Jurisdiction (UJ), are not viable options. Finally, this Article will discuss the propriety of military action: why state sovereignty is not the issue it used to be, the impact the “Responsibility to Protect” will have on state sovereignty, and how inaction by the United Nations (UN) Security Council to address CAH around the world has weakened its legitimacy. Ultimately, the facts presented will show that rapidly changing international law has eroded the notion of the sanctity of state sovereignty, and because the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has failed to protect the citizens of North Korea from its own leadership committing crimes against humanity, international military action is the only option to end the long-standing atrocities.

I. NORTH KOREA AND THE COMMISSION’S REPORT

The most reclusive, secretive country on Earth, North Korea is a mystery to most people.7 This can most likely be attributed to the policy established by the country’s first leader, Kim il-Sung, who “created the country’s policy of juche or self-reliance,” resulting in North Korea cutting itself off from the rest of the world politically, economically, and relying on its own military for protection.8 Yet, juche is now used as an “ideological weapon to justify its dictatorship and hereditary power succession plan . . . a means to justify its closed-door system externally.”9 For nearly 70 years, its Supreme Leaders, Kim il-Sung, his son, Kim Jung-il, and now Kim Jung Un, Kim il-Sung’s grandson,10 have abused, manipulated, and suppressed the human rights of the North Korean people under the principle of juche.11 Little good comes from its political situation, and for the most part, the world only hears about North Korea when it is threatening to obtain and/or use nuclear weapons.

It is estimated that North Korea has a population of just over 25 million people.12 Despite spending an estimated $1.3 billion on its missile program in 2012,13 North Korea has one of the world’s least open economies, with a gross domestic product of $1800 per capita, and has an estimated 25.6% unemployment rate.14 North Korea spends about one third of its income on military spending and has 1.2 million military members, twice as many as South Korea.15 A portion of North Korea’s citizens do not even have electricity in their homes, and those that do have electricity only receive it “a few hours per day.”16 There is no independent media, and the state relies on international aid to feed its population.17 The UN World Food Programme (WFP) estimates that more than 70% of the North Korean population is food insecure, with only about a fifth of its land being arable, and that children in WFP nurseries showed a 25% stunting prevalence due to the lack of food consumption.18 “In 2015, the U.N. [WFP] asked foreign donors for . . . $111 million in contributions.”19 However, donors are reluctant to help North Korea because of restrictions on “humanitarian workers and international fears over its nuclear ambitions.”20 There is no religious freedom in North Korea, nor is there an independent judicial system.21 North Korea is considered to be the third most corrupt country on earth.22

† Charlton J. Meginley is a Judge Advocate for the United States Air Force. He received his undergraduate degree in Criminal Justice from the University of Louisiana at Monroe, and his Juris Doctor from Louisiana State University. He currently serves as the Chief Senior Defense Counsel for the Air Force’s Central Circuit. Please note: the opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within this Article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency.
1 See Rex Tillerson, Secretary of State of the U.S., Remarks at the United Nations Security Council Ministerial Session on D.P.R.K., (Apr. 28, 2017) (transcript available at https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2017/04/270544.html).
2 North Korea’s Push over the Years to Become a Nuclear Power, L.A. T IMES (Apr. 14, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-north-korea-nuclear-timeline-20170414-htmlstory.html.
3 Olivia Enos, What the United States Can Do to Address North Korea’s Human Rights Crisis, THE FEDERALIST (Apr. 17, 2017), http://thefederalist.com/2017/04/17/united-states-can-address-north-koreas-human-rights-crisis/.
4 See U.N. Human Rights Council on Its Twenty-Fifth Session, Report of the Detailed Findings of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/25/CRP.1 (2014) [hereinafter U.N. Human Rights Council].
5 R.J. RUMMEL, D EATH BY G OVERNMENT Ch. 2 (Transaction Publishers, 1994).
6 See id.; see also Yael Stein and Elihu D. Ritcher, Suspected Mass Killings, GENOCIDE PREVENTION NOW, www.genocidepreventionnow.org (last visited Oct. 4, 2017).
7 See Charlotte Alfred, How North Korea Became So Isolated, HUFF POST (Oct. 17, 2014, 5:42 PM ), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/10/17/north-korea-history-isolation_n_5991000.html.
8 15 Fascinating Facts about Mysterious North Korea, USA TODAY (July 17, 2017 10:17 AM ), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2017/03/17/fascinating-facts-north-korea/99296938/.
9 See Columbia University, Juche Ideology, http://www2.law.columbia.edu/course_00S_L9436_001-North%20Korea%20materials/3.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2017); Dae-Kyu Yoon, The Constitution of North Korea: Its Changes and Implications, 27 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 1289, 1291 (2004).
10 See Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: North Korea, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kn.html (last updated Sept. 6, 2017).
11 See 15 Fascinating Facts about Mysterious North Korea, supra note 8.
12 Central Intelligence Agency, supra note 10.
13 Ramy Inocencio, North Korea’s Rocket Launches Cost $1.3 Billion, CNN (Dec. 12, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/12/12/business/north-korea-rocket-cost/index.html.
14 Central Intelligence Agency, supra note 10. See generally North Korea’s economic growth climbs to 17-year high in 2016 despite sanctions targeting nuclear program, CNBC (July 20, 2017 11:26 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/07/20/north-koreas-economic-growth-climbs-to-17-year-high-in-2016-despite-sanctions-targeting-nuclear-program.html (noting that the North Korean economy is growing, even in light of the sanctions).
15 20 Facts about North Korea, USA TODAY (Apr. 13, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/04/13/north-korea-factoids/2078831/.
16 See id.; Rick Newman, Here’s How Lousy Life is in North Korea, U.S. NEWS (Apr. 12, 2013), https://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/rick-newman/2013/04/12/heres-how-lousy-life-is-in-north-korea.
17 20 Facts about North Korea, supra note 15.
18 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME, http://www.wfp.org/countries/korea-democratic-peoples-republic (last visited Sept. 18, 2017); see also DPRK Country Brief, WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME, http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/ep/wfp276263.pdf?_ga=2.143296828.840591394.1505785676-1256538179.1505785676 (last visited Sept. 18, 2017). According to the WFP, “81 percent of DPRK’s population do not have acceptable diversity in their diet. People consume 25 percent less protein and 30 percent less fat than required for a healthy life, according to international standards. One in three children under five years of age, and almost half of the children between 12 and 23 months of age, are anemic.” Id.
19 Olivia Enos & Bruce Klinger, Next Steps for Human Rights in North Korea, HERITAGE FOUND. (Jan. 12, 2016), http://www.heritage.org/asia/report/next-steps-human-rights-north-korea.
20 Magdalena Mis, U.N. Calls for $111 Million for Crucial Aid for North Korea, REUTERS (Apr. 9, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-aid-un-idUSKBN0N01YK20150409.
21 20 Facts about North Korea, supra note 15.
22 See Corruption Perceptions Index 2016, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016 (last visited Sept. 20, 2017) (noting Somalia as the most corrupt nation, followed by South Sudan); Aza Wee Sile, These are the World’s Most Corrupt Countries, CNBC (Jan. 24, 2017, 11:07 PM ), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/01/24/these-are-the-worlds-most-corrupt-countries.html.

INTRODUCTION

Clara Zheng is from Zilin, China, the closest providence to the ChinaNorth Korea border.¹ For the past several years, her church in Zilin has been operating a secret safe house for North Korean defectors. Clara has read in the Korean news and international reports that many North Korean families risk their lives by crossing the river from North Korea to flee to China.² In North Korea, being a Christian is considered one of the gravest political crimes.³ Clara wondered how anyone could sit idly by and watch the Chinese government force countless starving North Korean families to repatriate.⁴ In Clara’s church, people talk about how the Chinese government may punish Chinese citizens who help North Koreans. Last month, despite the well-planned church operation, Clara’s friend who accompanied her on many operations was arrested and put in jail. Fearful of being punished by the Chinese government, Clara paid $15,000 to travel to the United States, hoping for a safe haven. She was hopeful because, in the past, the U.S. government has granted refugee status to couples that faced forced sterilization of their second child under China’s One-Child Policy.⁵ However, last week, an immigration judge denied Clara refugee status and ordered her to be removed from the U.S. Her lawyer told her that the court’s decision is not surprising because the U.S. does not generally grant refugee status to a Chinese citizen who aided North Korean defectors, in violation of a generally applicable law.⁶

The 108th Congress, with the assistance of President George W. Bush, acted to lend American support to the North Korean refugees by passing the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004.⁷ The congressional act implies that the U.S. will protect, or at least endorse, groups that support North Korean human rights, including the people who feed, house, and protect North Korean defectors.⁸ Ironically, however, the U.S. government still denied refugee status to many Chinese citizens who were punished by their government for aiding North Korean defectors.⁹ The Third Circuit Court of Appeals denied refugee status to the Chinese applicants because they violated a “fairly administered [Chinese] law” and the punishment did not amount to “persecution.”¹⁰ However, is there really such a law that outlaws assistance to North Korean defectors? If there is, is this Chinese law and policy in violation of certain international human rights?How should the U.S. courts analyze “persecution” by non-democratic governments like that of China and North Korea? How do diplomatic relations between the U.S. and these two countries affect America’s open disapproval of China’s human rights violations?

The Third Circuit has held that if a law is (1) fairly administered or (2) generally applicable to all citizens, then the presumption is that the law is legitimate and may be rightfully enforced.¹¹ In other words, if a court decides that: (1) there is a Chinese law prohibiting assistance to North Korean defectors, and (2) such law is generally applicable to Chinese citizens, then no protection would be granted to the applicant, whose act was the exact behavior the North Korean Human Rights Act wished to protect.¹² As a result, the courts may deny asylum/refugee status to these Chinese citizens who then might be forced to return to China, where he/she faces the possibility of punishment, often severe, for aiding the defectors.¹³

Thus, the current analysis needs to include whether prosecution was a mere pretext for persecution. Specifically, is the punishment the applicants face upon return so severe, when compared to the crime, that the prosecution amounts to persecution? This Article suggests that China might be using criminal punishment as a pretext for persecution, and the evidence is based on disproportionately severe punishment compared to the severity of the actual crime.¹⁴ Hence, even if one assumes that a Chinese law was fairly and generally applied to all of its citizens, it is  possible that the Chinese citizens who aid North Korean defectors are persecuted through disproportionately severe punishment.¹⁵ This Article argues that the courts should first examine an applicant’s criminal history, if any, and secondly, use a hybrid approach for granting refugee status to Chinese citizens who would be prosecuted (vis-a-vis persecuted) for assisting North Korean defectors. These two approaches are of paramount importance especially when the courts are uncertain whether the Chinese penal code outlaws such activity.¹⁶

Part I of the Article begins with a brief discussion of U.S. refugee law, international human rights law, applicable Chinese law, and recent U.S. case law under Long Hao Li v. Attorney General. Part II analyzes whether criminal prosecution of Chinese citizens who assist North Korean defectors may be a mere pretext for political prosecution. Part III argues that the U.S. courts should consider a hybrid approach; a totality of the circumstances test that considers additional grounds of appeal for a refugee application.¹⁷ The hybrid approach is juxtaposed with the dominant, current approach, where refugee status is denied or granted on account of five possible grounds (race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion).¹⁸ The Article will then explain how the hybrid approach can better reflect Li’s situation and better complement the international human rights standard. Part IV applies the two approaches analyzed in Parts II and III to someone in Clara’s situation. Finally, the Article will discuss prospects for human rights implementation and legal development in China. 

I. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARD AND THE U.S. REFUGEE LAW

The Attorney General may grant refugee status to an alien who has suffered past persecution or has a well-founded fear of future persecution.¹⁹ The applicant must prove that he is unable or unwilling to return to the country of origin, because of persecution “on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”²⁰

A. Persecution

Even though the United Nations Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status does not offer a definition of persecution,²¹ U.S. courts traditionally held that persecution means that there is a subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable threat to life or freedom that an ordinary person would regard as offensive (i.e., death, torture, confinement, or extreme economic deprivation).²² Also, the harm is “inflicted either by the government of a country or by persons or an organization that the government was unable or unwilling to control.”²³ In regards to the objective standard of “reasonable fear,” an applicant’s testimony without corroborating evidence may be sufficient, as long as it is “credible, persuasive, and refers to specific facts.”²⁴

Still, applying a general definition of persecution is not easy for the courts, as they are tasked with the challenge of determining whether a government had a “legitimate, prosecutorial purpose” in punishing people who allegedly committed a crime.²⁵ In deciding whether a government has a legitimate ground to prosecute a person or a group, some courts have focused their analysis on whether a government has reason to believe that the person was engaged in criminal activity.²⁶ Other courts have focused on whether a government has undertaken “any formal prosecutorial measures” regarding the actions committed.²⁷ A marginally smaller number of courts have also discussed whether a government was driven by a political motive in excessively or arbitrarily punishing a person.²⁸

1 Clara Zheng’s story as portrayed in this Article is entirely fictitious. Her story serves to illustrate the typical plight of an individual who violates Chinese law in order to aid North Korean defectors. While not every story is the exactly the same, every Chinese citizen that gives assistance to a North Korean risks much in doing so, and if caught faces serious repercussions. The story of Clara Zheng is meant to personalize for readers the challenges such people encounter regularly.
2 See, e.g., Those Who Flee: North Korean Refugees, N. KOR. NOW, http://www.northkoreanow.org/the-crisis/those-who-flee-north-korean-refugees (last visited Aug. 27, 2015).
3 Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Comm’n of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of N. Kor. on its Twenty-Fifth Session, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/25/63, at 7–8 (Feb. 7, 2014); see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2013: NORTH KOREA (2013), http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2013/country-chapters/north-korea [hereinafter WORLD REPORT 2013: NORTH KOREA] (reporting that many North Korean defectors flee to neighboring countries because of serious food shortages, insecurity, and fear of torture and inhumane treatment, political prisoner/labor camps, and execution for “vaguely defined offenses such as ‘crimes against the state and crimes against the people.’”).
4 See Those Who Flee, supra note 2.
5 Sun Wen Chen v. Att’y Gen., 491 F.3d 100, 108–09 (3d Cir. 2007), overruled by Guang Lin-Zheng v. Att’y Gen., 557 F.3d 147, 157 (3d Cir. 2009).
6 See, e.g., Long Hao Li v. Att’y Gen., 633 F.3d 136, 137–38 (3d Cir. 2011); but see Xun Li v. Holder, 559 F.3d 1096, 1110–11, 1113 (9th Cir. 2009).
7 North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-333, 118 Stat. 1287 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 7801–7845 (2012 & Supp. I 2013)).
8 See id. § 203, 118 Stat. at 1294 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 7833 (2012 & Supp. I 2013)).
9 Alyce S. Ahn, Note, Prosecution or Persecution: Contradictions Between U.S. Foreign Policy & the Adjudication of Asylum Claims Involving the Harboring of North Korean Refugees, 24 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 311, 311–12 (2010).
10 Long Hao Li., 633 F.3d at 138, 141, 147.
11 Id. at 137–38, 141.
12 See Xun Li, 559 F.3d at 1112–13. However, “a generally applicable law can provide the basis for withholding of removal, but only where the petitioner establishes a connection between the prosecution and his or her political opinion . . . .” Long Hao Li, 633 F.3d at 137.
13 See, e.g., Long Hao Li, 633 F.3d at 137–38, 143–44; see also Xun Li v. Holder, 559 F.3d at 1112 (finding clear evidence that the Chinese petitioner would be subjected to severe punishment upon return to China).
14 Long Hao Li, at 151 (Roth, J., dissenting).
15 Xun Li, 559 F.3d at 1109 (quoting Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 1996)).
16 Compare Long Hao Li, 633 F.3d at 144 (finding “that Chinese law penalizes people who assist others who cross the border illegally”), with Xun Li 559 F.3d at 1098 (stating that the court has not “discovered a Chinese law that prohibits providing assistance to foreign refugees”).
17 See Ang v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 50, 55–56 (1st Cir. 2005).
18 See infra section I(B).
19 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (2012); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2012); see also 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.13(b)(1), (b)(1)(i)(A)–(B) (2013) (stating that the well-founded fear of future persecution is presumed when suffering from a past persecution is proved; however, the government can
rebut this presumption by a preponderance of evidence that the conditions in the applicant’s country have changed or that the applicant is reasonably expected to relocate to another part of country).
20 8 U.S.C. § 1158(c)(2) (2012).
21 Michel Moussalli (Director of International Protection), Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status Under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, ¶ 51, U.N. Doc. HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV.1 (1979)
[hereinafter U.N. Handbook].
22 13 Am. Jur. 3D Proof of Facts § 4 (1991) [hereinafter Proof of Facts]; see also U.N. Handbook, supra note 21, ¶ 52 (“The subjective character of fear of persecution requires an evaluation of the opinions and feelings of the person concerned. It is also in the light of such opinions and feelings that any actual or anticipated measures against him must necessarily be viewed.”).
23 Proof of Facts, supra note 22, § 4.
24 Tafreshi v. McElroy, 112 F.3d 505, No. 96-2755, 1997 WL 234670, at *2 (2d Cir. 1997) (unpublished table decision (quoting Melendez v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 926 F.2d 211, 215 (2d Cir. 1991); 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a) (2013); see also Doptante v. INS., 198 F.3d 253, No.
97-71408, 1999 WL 801509, at *1 (9th Cir. 1999) (unpublished table decision); Velis v. INS, 47 F.3d 1178, No. 94-9526, 1995 WL 66536, at *3–4 (10th Cir. 1995) (unpublished table decision).
25 Proof of Facts, supra note 22.
26 Ramirez Rivas v. INS, 899 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1990), vacated, 502 U.S. 1025 (1992) (mem.).
27 Blanco-Lopez v. INS, 858 F.2d 531, 534 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that a government’s prosecution is “legitimate” if it has undertaken “formal prosecutorial measures”), superseded by statute, Real ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231, as recognized in Parussimova v. Mukasey, 555 F.3d 734, 739–40 (9th Cir. 2008).
28 See, e.g., Ramirez Rivas, 899 F.2d at 868 (citing U.N. Handbook, supra note 21, ¶ 85).

† Ra Hee Jeon was born and raised in South Korea. She graduated cum laude from George Washington University in 2011, and she received her Juris Doctorate degree from Regent University School of Law in 2015. She currently practices immigration law in Virginia Beach, Virginia.