Immigration Law Archives - Regent University School of Law https://jgjpp.regent.edu/tag/immigration-law/ Journal of Global Justice and Public Policy Tue, 04 Mar 2025 14:17:56 +0000 en-US hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=6.8.1 https://jgjpp.regent.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/cropped-Regent-Favicon-32x32.png Immigration Law Archives - Regent University School of Law https://jgjpp.regent.edu/tag/immigration-law/ 32 32 UTTERLY ALONE IN COURT: HOW UNACCOMPANIED MINORS’ LACK OF ACCESS TO APPOINTED COUNSEL FALLS SHORT OF DOMESTIC, INTERNATIONAL, AND BIBLICAL STANDARDS https://jgjpp.regent.edu/utterly-alone-in-court-how-unaccompanied-minors-lack-of-access-to-appointed-counsel-falls-short-of-domestic-international-and-biblical-standards/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=utterly-alone-in-court-how-unaccompanied-minors-lack-of-access-to-appointed-counsel-falls-short-of-domestic-international-and-biblical-standards Tue, 04 Mar 2025 14:17:56 +0000 https://jgjpp.regent.edu/?p=1263 The post UTTERLY ALONE IN COURT: HOW UNACCOMPANIED MINORS’ LACK OF ACCESS TO APPOINTED COUNSEL FALLS SHORT OF DOMESTIC, INTERNATIONAL, AND BIBLICAL STANDARDS appeared first on Regent University School of Law.

]]>

Elizabeth M. Gilbert | 10 Regent J. Glob. Just. & Pub. Pol. 97 (2024)

The post UTTERLY ALONE IN COURT: HOW UNACCOMPANIED MINORS’ LACK OF ACCESS TO APPOINTED COUNSEL FALLS SHORT OF DOMESTIC, INTERNATIONAL, AND BIBLICAL STANDARDS appeared first on Regent University School of Law.

]]>
TRAUMA INFORMED LEGAL CARE: A PARADIGM SHIFT IN PROVIDING LEGAL SERVICES TO UNACCOMPANIED IMMIGRANT CHILDREN https://jgjpp.regent.edu/trauma-informed-legal-care-a-paradigm-shift-in-providing-legal-services-to-unaccompanied-immigrant-children/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=trauma-informed-legal-care-a-paradigm-shift-in-providing-legal-services-to-unaccompanied-immigrant-children Thu, 06 Feb 2025 15:38:44 +0000 https://jgjpp.regent.edu/?p=1126 The post TRAUMA INFORMED LEGAL CARE: A PARADIGM SHIFT IN PROVIDING LEGAL SERVICES TO UNACCOMPANIED IMMIGRANT CHILDREN appeared first on Regent University School of Law.

]]>

Katie Chadliev & Stacy Newman† | 3 Regent J. Glob. Just. & Pub. Pol. 249

INTRODUCTION

Historically, the United States has been a popular destination country for international immigrants, and the topic of immigration tends to be controversial in the American political landscape. In the summer of 2014, however, a special group of immigrants dominated the national conversation: unaccompanied children from Latin America. 1 Headlines from national news outlines reported on the vitriolic issue of how the U.S. should respond to the perceived increase in unaccompanied children crossing the border. President Obama addressed the issue, stating that although the actual number of children crossing the border was at an all-time low,2 he would still implement a program to provide unaccompanied migrant children representation through the creation and funding of AmeriCorps.3 Created in June of 2014, the organization is funded by two million dollars in grants and “provide[s] one-hundred lawyers and paralegals in twenty-eight states” to represent unaccompanied immigrants “under the age of sixteen in removal proceedings.”4

Providing legal representation in a system where there is no right to counsel is an important first step, 5 but the challenges of representing unaccompanied child immigrants demands a multidisciplinary approach. Recently, the rise of “Trauma-Informed Care” (TIC) in the medical and social services field has revolutionized services for children, and its philosophy and methods are directly transferrable to those engaged in “legal care.” 6 Through a wedding of TIC and zealous legal representation, a child’s journey through the legal system need not be as traumatic as the journey to the United States.

I. BACKGROUND OF LATIN AMERICAN IMMIGRATION

The United States is often referred to as “a nation of immigrants,”7 and according to the Migration Policy Institute, the U.S. is the number one destination for immigrants. 8 In fact, according to the Census Bureau, the percentage of the United States population that is foreign born has been on the rise since the 1970s and reached 12.9% in 2010.9 The Census Bureau also reports that the majority of foreign born people in America are from Mexico and Central America. 10

The top Latin American source countries for immigration to the United States are Mexico, El Salvador, and Guatemala,11 all countries with high levels of political and economic insecurity. 12 Many explanations are circulated for the high number of immigrants from these countries, and each source country has different “push” factors. However, a few themes seem to emerge from every analysis: dangerous or economically disadvantageous conditions in the home country, the goal of family reunification, and relative proximity to the United States.13

Although Latin American immigration to the United States has been on the rise for decades, the summer of 2014 highlighted a perceived surge of unaccompanied immigrant children. 14 The issue came to the forefront of American news when townspeople in Arizona and California gathered to protest and turn away buses of immigrant children. 15 In California, the buses were leaving overcrowded Texas detention centers and the children were in the care of older relatives, but in Arizona, the buses transported unaccompanied immigrant children exclusively. 16 Arizona protestors bearing signs with phrases like, “no open borders” and blocking buses full of children provoked outrage and added a new wrinkle to the immigration debate:17 how should the United States deal with unaccompanied children crossing the border?


† Student attorneys in the Thomas and Mack Immigration Clinic at the William S. Boyd School of Law. Many thanks to Professor Fatma Marouf for her fearless leadership of the Clinic and her invaluable contributions to this article, which started out as a project for her immigration class.
1 PETER J. MEYER ET AL ., CONG . RESEARCH SERV., UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN FROM CENTRAL AMERICA : FOREIGN POLICY CONSIDERATIONS, 1 (2016), http://trac.syr.edu/Immigration/library/P10211.pdf; see e.g. Sonia Nazario, The Children of the Drug Wars: A Refugee, Not an Immigration Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2 014/07/13/opinion/sunday/a-refugee-crisis-not-an-immigration-crisis.html; Lauren Fox, Anti-Immigrant Hate Coming From Everyday Americans, U.S. NEWS (July 24, 2014), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/07/24/anti-immigrant-hate-coming-from-everyday-americans.
2 President Barak Obama, Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Immigration (Nov. 20, 2014).
3 Erin B. Corcoran, Getting Kids Out of Harm’s Way: The United States’ Obligation to Operationalize the Best Interest of the Child Principle for Unaccompanied Minors, 47 C ONN. L. REV . ONLINE 1, 5 (2014).
4 Id.
5 A recent survey of similarly-situated immigrants in removal proceedings revealed that immigrants with legal representation enjoyed odds fifteen times greater than immigrants without representation. Ingrid V. Eagly & Steven Shafer, A National Study of Access to Counsel in Immigration Court, 164 U. P A . L. REV . 1, 2 (2015). Recently, New York became the first state to provide all immigrants in removal proceedings with an attorney. New York State Becomes First in Nation to Provide Lawyers for All Immigrants Detained and Facing Deportation, VERA INST. JUST., https://www.vera.org/newsroom/press-releases/new-york-state-becomes-first-in-the-nation-to-provide-lawyers-for-all-immigrants-detained-and-facing-deportation (Apr. 7, 2017).
6 Carly B. Dierkhising, et al., Trauma-Informed Justice Roundtable: Current Issues and New Directions in Creating Trauma-Informed Juvenile Justice Systems, NAT’L CHILD TRAUMATIC S TRESS NETWORK (Aug. 2013), http://www.nctsn.org/sites/default/files/a
ssets/pdfs/jj_trauma_brief_introduction_final.pdf.
7 See, e.g., Kay Deaux, A Nation of Immigrants: Living Our Legacy, 62 J. SOC. ISSUES 633, 634 (2006). This phrase was popularized by John F. Kennedy’s book of the same name. Id.; JOHN F. KENNEDY, A NATION OF IMMIGRANTS (1959).
8 Top 25 Destinations of International Migrants, M IGRATION POL’Y INST. (2015), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/programs/data-hub/international-migration-statistics.
9 Steven A. Camarota, Ctr. for Immigration Studies, Immigrants in the United States: A Profile of America’s Foreign-Born Population 9 (2012),
http://cis.org/sites/cis.org/files/articles/2012/immigrants-in-the-united-states-2012.pdf; The Foreign–Born Population in the United States, U.S. Census Bureau 3, https://www.census.gov/newsroom/pdf/cspan_fb_slides.pdf (last visited Mar. 18, 2017).
10 The Foreign–Born Population in the United States, supra note 9, at 6; CAMAROTA, supra note 9, at 16.
11 Jie Zong & Jeanne Batalova, Frequently Requested Statistics on Immigrants and Immigration in the United States, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Apr. 14, 2016), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/frequently-requested-statistics-immigrants-and-immigration-united-states.
12 See U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, MISSION TO CENTRAL AMERICA : THE FLIGHT OF UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN TO THE UNITED STATES 2, 8 (Nov. 2013), http://www.usccb.org/about/migration-policy/upload/Mission-To-Central-America-FINAL-2.pdf; Jie Zong & Jeanne Batalova, Central American Immigrants in the United States, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Sept. 2, 2015), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/central-american-immigrants-united-states.
13 U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, supra note 12; see also Gordon H. Hanson & Craig McIntosh, Birth Rates and Border Crossings: Latin American Migration to the US, Canada, Spain, and the UK, 122 ECON . J. 707, 708–09, 716 (2012); Jesus Rios & Steve Crabtree, One in Four Latin Americans Wishes to Emigrate, GALLUP (Jan. 21, 2008), http://www.gallup.com/poll/103837/one-four-latin-americans-wishes-emigrate.aspx.
14 PETER J. MEYER ET AL., supra note 1.
15 Michael Martinez et al, Growing Protests Over Where to Shelter Immigrant Children Hits Arizona, CNN (July 16, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/07/15/us/arizona-immigrant-children/; Michael Martinez & Holly Yan, Showdown: California Town Turns Away Buses of Detained Immigrants, CNN (last updated July 3, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/07/02/us/california-immigrant-transfers/.
16 See sources cited supra note 15.
17 See Martinez et al., supra note 15. Some protestors also distributed flyers which read “[w]e are being invaded!” Id.

The post TRAUMA INFORMED LEGAL CARE: A PARADIGM SHIFT IN PROVIDING LEGAL SERVICES TO UNACCOMPANIED IMMIGRANT CHILDREN appeared first on Regent University School of Law.

]]>
TANGLED UP: RESTORING THE PARENTAL RIGHTS OF IMMIGRANTS CAUGHT BETWEEN IMMIGRATION COURT AND FAMILY COURT https://jgjpp.regent.edu/tangled-up-restoring-the-parental-rights-of-immigrants-caught-between-immigration-court-and-family-court/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=tangled-up-restoring-the-parental-rights-of-immigrants-caught-between-immigration-court-and-family-court Wed, 23 Oct 2024 16:14:15 +0000 https://jgjpp.regent.edu/?p=962 The post TANGLED UP: RESTORING THE PARENTAL RIGHTS OF IMMIGRANTS CAUGHT BETWEEN IMMIGRATION COURT AND FAMILY COURT appeared first on Regent University School of Law.

]]>

By Jessica N. Flores | 2 Regent J. Glob. Just. & Pub. Pol. 1 (2015)

INTRODUCTION

“They stole my babies from me. They took them from me. . . . I don’t know if I’ll ever see them again,” a woman detained in federal immigration  custody exclaimed.1 The woman unlawfully emigrated from Jamaica to the  United States over twenty years ago.2 After her arrival, she gave birth to U.S. citizen children.3 When U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement  (ICE) arrested her for immigration violations, she lost physical custody of  them.4 While in ICE detention, she only knew that a state agency had placed her children in foster care, but she did not know any other  pertinent details about their status.5 After she was detained, she had no  contact with the caseworker who handled their subsequent placement.6 This unfortunate woman faced the prospect of deportation, and consequently feared that she may never see her children again.7

Sadly, this situation is not uncommon for an undocumented immigrant parent in ICE custody.8 As of 2011, at least 5,100 children were  in foster care due to either their parent’s being placed in detention facilities, or because of their subsequent deportation.9 How and why are otherwise functional families residing in the United States constantly being separated by the federal government?

Since federal statutes govern immigration law and state statutes  govern family law, the two areas of law collide when immigrants are a party in a child custody case.10 The example discussed above illustrates the usual result: ICE detains immigrants and separates them from their U.S. citizen children. The federal government controls immigration removal hearings, and state governments, via family court, handle child custody proceedings.11 Instead of the federal and state governments smoothly intersecting, they stay on parallel tracks by separately enforcing two judicial proceedings.12 Due to the separation, family courts terminate parental rights without taking into consideration a parent’s immigration status or detention.13 ICE is not ignorant to the injustice—demonstrated by an ICE issued August 2013 directive (ICE Directive).14 The ICE Directive created policies to help detained immigrant parents become involved in family court proceedings.15

This Article argues that despite the recent ICE Directive detained and deported immigrant parents still face obstacles in maintaining legal custody of their U.S. citizen children. Part I of this Article discusses the legal basis for the separation between immigration law and family law. It also provides a legal summary of the development of the fundamental right to be a parent as established by the U.S. Supreme Court. Part II discusses the injustice undocumented immigrant parents confront in state court proceedings that terminate parental rights. Part III provides an overview of the ICE Directive. Part IV analyzes problems with the ICE Directive. Part V introduces several proposals, which if followed, may help to protect the parental rights of immigrants, and ensure that the United States adheres to its public policy of keeping family units intact.

I. AN OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL AND STATE LEGAL AUTHORITY

A. Federal Immigration Authority

It is undisputed that the federal government governs immigration law, as the U.S. Supreme Court has consistently recognized. For example, in 1889, the Court stated that “[t]he government of the United States, through the action of the legislative department, can exclude aliens from its territory is a proposition which we do not think open to controversy.”16 The Court more recently acknowledged the inherent federal power over immigration law when it analyzed the constitutionality of state legislation in Arizona v. United States.17 The Court noted that the federal government has “undoubted power over the subject of immigration and the status of aliens.”18 The federal government derives its plenary authority to regulate immigration from several clauses of the U.S. Constitution.19

Exercising its authority, Congress enacted the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), a comprehensive statute on immigration law.20 The INA authorizes various agencies within the federal government to enforce national immigration laws.21 The Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice, the Department of Labor, and the Department of State constitute the main government immigration enforcement agencies.22 ICE is “the principal investigation arm of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security . . . .”23 Within ICE is the Office of Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO).24 The ERO “identifies and apprehends removable aliens, detains these individuals when necessary and removes illegal aliens from the United States.”25 The INA gives federal agencies like ICE the authority to arrest and detain undocumented immigrants.26 Since the federal legislature enacts immigration laws, and federal agencies enforce them, the federal government alone controls the procedures that lead to the removal of immigrant parents from the United
States.27


1 SETH FREED WESSLER, APPLIED RESEARCH CTR., SHATTERED FAMILIES: THE PERILOUS INTERSECTION OF IMMIGRATION AND THE CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM 22 (2011) [hereinafter SHATTERED FAMILIES], http://www.sph.sc.edu/cli/word_pdf/ARC_Report_ Nov2011.pdf.
2 Id.
3 See id.
4 See id.
5 See id.
6 Id. 7 Id.
8 See id. at 29.
9 Id. at 6.
10 See David B. Thronson, Custody and Contradictions: Exploring Immigration Law as Federal Family Law in the Context of Child Custody, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 453, 454, 456 (2008) [hereinafter Custody and Contradictions].
11 See id. at 454, 456–57.
12 See id. at 456.
13 See id. at 468–69.
14 U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, 11064.1: FACILITATING PARENTAL INTERESTS IN THE COURSE OF CIVIL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES 1 (2013)[hereinafter ICE DIRECTIVE], http://www.ice.gov/doclib/detention-reform/pdf/parental_interest_directive_ signed.pdf.
15 See id. 16 Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 603 (1889). See also Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954) (noting that “the formulation of [immigration] policies [being] entrusted exclusively to Congress has become about as firmly imbedded in the legislative and judicial tissues of our body politic as any aspect of our government.”).
17 Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2497–98 (2012).
18 Id. at 2498.
19 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cls. 3, 4, 11. See Stephanie M. Gomes, Building Trust in Our Communities: States Encourage Their Residents to Speak Up in the Wake of the Federal Government’s Silence, 33 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 715, 721 (2015) (noting that the previous clauses grant the federal government power over immigration). The plenary power includes both implicit and explicit constitutional authorities. The precise source of federal immigration power is debated. See also Evan C. Zoldan, Strangers in a Strange Land:
Domestic Subsidiaries of Foreign Corporations and the Ban on Political Contributions from Foreign Sources, 34 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 573, 584 (2003) (noting that there are textual and non-textual sources for the plenary power over immigration); Allison Brownell Tirres, Property Outliers: Non-Citizens, Property Rights and State Power, 27 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 77, 86 (2012) (noting that the source of the constitutional basis for plenary power has been debated at length); Anne E. Pettit, “One Manner of Law”: The Supreme Court, Stare Decisis and the Immigration Law Plenary Power Doctrine, 24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 165, 172–73 (1996) (describing the U.S. Supreme Court’s use of various sources to support the federal government’s plenary power over immigration).
20 See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1537 (2012).
21 See id. § 1103(a)(1) (“The Secretary of Homeland Security shall be charged with the administration and enforcement of this chapter and all other laws relating to the immigration and naturalization of aliens.”).
22 See IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY LAW: PROBLEMS AND STRATEGIES 3 (Lenni B. Benson et al. eds., 2013).
23 ICE, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, https://www.dhs.gov/external/ice (last visited
Oct. 22, 2015).
24 See Who We Are, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, https://www.ice.gov/
about (last visited Oct. 22, 2015).
25 Enforcement and Removal Operations, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,
https://www.ice.gov/ero (last visited Oct. 15, 2015).
26 See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a) (2012).
27 See 3 TEX. JUR. 3D Aliens’ Rights § 5 (2015).


† Jessica N. Flores is a law clerk at Kelley Drye & Warren LLP in New York. She graduated from Cornell Law School in 2015 with a concentration in public law, and was a blog editor for the Cornell Journal of Public Policy. She was also a member of the Latin American Law Student Association (LALSA). During law school, Jessica interned with the  Department of Immigrant and Refugee Services at Catholic Charities Community Services, Archdiocese of New York. She received her B.A. in history with a concentration in Spanish from Columbia University in 2010. She would like to thank her parents, John and Lucille, sisters, Danielle and Melissa, and Jim Lynch for their unconditional support. She would especially like to thank Professor Steven Yale-Loehr for his invaluable guidance throughout the writing process.

The post TANGLED UP: RESTORING THE PARENTAL RIGHTS OF IMMIGRANTS CAUGHT BETWEEN IMMIGRATION COURT AND FAMILY COURT appeared first on Regent University School of Law.

]]>
THE RIGHTS-BEARING CHILD’S BEST INTERESTS: IMPLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT’S REJECTION OF A CHILD-RETURN ORDER IN X V. LATVIA https://jgjpp.regent.edu/the-rights-bearing-childs-best-interests-implications-of-the-european-courts-rejection-of-a-child-return-order-in-x-v-latvia/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=the-rights-bearing-childs-best-interests-implications-of-the-european-courts-rejection-of-a-child-return-order-in-x-v-latvia Mon, 19 Aug 2024 20:22:03 +0000 https://jgjpp.regent.edu/?p=715 The post THE RIGHTS-BEARING CHILD’S BEST INTERESTS: IMPLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT’S REJECTION OF A CHILD-RETURN ORDER IN X V. LATVIA appeared first on Regent University School of Law.

]]>

Kaitlin M. Ball* | 1 Regent J. Glob. Just. & Pub. Pol. 163 (2015)

Download PDF

INTRODUCTION

“The history of childhood is a nightmare from which we have only recently begun to awaken.”
– Lloyd deMause[1]

Despite barriers created by culture, language, gender, and even age, there is one thing everyone holds in common: he or she was once a child. Children always have been, and always will be, important. Nonetheless, there remains no global consensus as to the legal role of the child. In the past few decades, however, this debate has gained considerable momentum and the rights of the child in international law have begun to crystalize.

In its 2013 Grand Chamber decision in X v. Latvia,[2] the European Court of Human Rights added Europe’s voice to the fray, and opined as to the role and rights of the child in European legal culture. In this decision, the European Court of Human Rights has done more than simply consider the best interests of the child; it has given that child a voice. This article will explore that judgment and explain how the European Court of Human Rights has employed the legal doctrines available to it in such a way that not only maintains the integrity of the legal instruments before it, but also furthers the child-centered jurisprudential dialogue.

First, this article will introduce the facts, procedural background, and legal analyses pertinent to the European Court of Human Right’s X v. Latvia judgment. Second, by way of background, this article will then explore the relevant legal theories, history, and instruments at play in the judgment and the historical development of the best interests of the child standard and child-centered jurisprudence. Third, this article will present an analysis of how the above-mentioned legal theories, history, and instruments helped inform the European Court of Human Rights judgment in such a way that furthered the child-centered jurisprudential dialogue in a sustainable manner easily adopted by domestic courts.

a. The Facts of X v. Latvia

The applicant (X.) is a Latvian national born in 1974, and, as of 2007, an Australian citizen.[3] X. met T. at the beginning of 2004, and moved into his apartment at the end of that year during the final stages of pregnancy.[4]

In early February 2005, X. gave birth to a daughter, but listed no father on the birth certificate.[5] As a result, X. was able to claim single-parent benefits from the Australian government while she continued to cohabitate with T.[6] X.’s relationship with T. began to “deteriorate,” although she continued to live with T. as a tenant.[7]

In July 2008, X. left for Latvia with her then three-year old daughter.[8] One month later, in August 2008, T. sought to establish his parental rights with respect to the child in Australian Family Court by means of a sworn affidavit that stated:

[H]e had been in a relationship with the applicant [X.] since 2004 and the [applicant] had always indicated that he was the father of the child; the rental agreement . . . was a sham and had been a mutual decision; he had made false statements to the [Australian] social-security services in order to enable the applicant to receive single-parent benefit. T. asserted that the applicant [X.] had left Australia with the child without his consent.[9]

T. further claimed that X. had fled to an unknown location in Latvia, and submitted correspondence with members of his family in support of this claim.[10] While X. had been invited to attend the hearing through various electronic means, she was not present.[11] On November 6, 2008, the Australian Family Court recognized T.’s paternity in respects of the child, and further held that T. had exercised joint responsibility for the child since the child’s birth.[12]

T. therefore sought to pursue matters under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (Hague Abduction Convention), an international instrument that entered into force in 1980 in order to help address the rising problem of international parental child abduction.[13] The Australian judge refused to rule on whether the child’s removal had been wrongful pursuant to the Hague Abduction Convention and expressly left that determination for Latvian courts; X. nonetheless did not appeal the judgment.[14]

b. Procedural Developments Leading to the 2013 Decision by a Grand Chamber of the European Human Rights Court

On September 22, 2008, the Latvian Central Authority received a request from T. asking that the child be returned to Australia under the Hague Abduction Convention.[15] The Australian Central Authority furnished a sworn affidavit detailing the pertinent Australian law and guaranteed that T. had exercised joint custody over the child with X. on the date the child had been removed from Australia.[16] On November 19, 2008, the Riga City Zemgale District Court considered the Hague Abduction Convention request in the presence of both X. and T.[17]

At this hearing, X. denied that T. had any paternal rights, as she had been married to another man at the time of the child’s birth, and T. had made no efforts to have his paternity recognized before the child’s departure from Australia.[18] X. further alleged that T. had acted aggressively towards her, and accused T. of initiating proceedings under the Hague Abduction Convention “only in order to benefit from them in criminal proceedings that had allegedly been brought against him in Australia.”[19]

The representative appointed by the local Latvian guardianship institution urged the District Court to dismiss T.’s request, arguing that X. had been a single mother at the time of the child’s removal from Australia, and “that the child had developed ties with Latvia.”[20] X. further lodged a complaint under Article 13 of the Hague Abduction Convention.[21]

The Latvian District Court instead granted T.’s request, ruling that the child’s removal had been wrongful and ordering that the child be returned to Australia immediately (not later than six weeks after its decision).[22] The court held that, pursuant to an uncontested judgment by an Australian family court, T. and X. exercised joint parental responsibility.[23] The court surmised that the Latvian courts did not have the authority to reverse that decision, or interpret the relevant Australian law.[24] The District Court equally dismissed the allegation of potential psychological harm as unfounded.[25]

X. appealed the Latvian District Court’s judgment, alleging that she had been the child’s sole guardian both in law and in fact upon their departure from Australia.[26] X. further claimed that the child’s return to Australia would “expose the child to psychological harm.”[27] X. submitted a psychologist’s certificate, which had been prepared after the District Court’s judgment, supporting this assertion.[28] Moreover, X. submitted additional evidence seeking to establish the child’s ties with Latvia, including that the child spoke Latvian as a native language.[29] Further, X. alleged that T. had mistreated both her and her child, and accused the District Court of wrongfully refusing to request information from the Australian Central Authority regarding T.’s criminal record.[30]

Continue Reading in Full PDF


  1. THE HISTORY OF CHILDHOOD 1 (1974). ↩
  2. X v. Latvia (No. 27853/09), Eur. Ct. H.R., Grand Chamber (2013). ↩
  3. Id. ¶ 9. ↩
  4. Id. ¶ 10. ↩
  5. Id. ¶ 11. ↩
  6. Id. ↩
  7. Id. ↩
  8. Id. ¶ 12. ↩
  9. Id. ¶ 13. ↩
  10. Id. ↩
  11. Id. ¶ 14. ↩
  12. Id. ¶ 15. ↩
  13. Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct. 25, 1980, T. I. A. S. No. 11670. [hereinafter Hague Abduction Convention]. ↩
  14. X v. Latvia, Grand Chamber, ¶¶ 15–16. ↩
  15. Id. ¶ 17. ↩
  16. Id. ↩
  17. Id. ¶ 18. ↩
  18. Id. ¶ 19. ↩
  19. Id. ↩
  20. Id. ¶ 20. ↩
  21. See id. ¶ 21. ↩
  22. Id. ↩
  23. Id. ↩
  24. Id. ↩
  25. Id. ↩
  26. Id. ¶ 22. ↩
  27. Id. ↩
  28. Id. ↩
  29. Id. ¶ 23. ↩
  30. Id. ↩

* Kaitlin M. Ball is a PhD Candidate at the Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Cambridge. She would like to thank Professor Diane Marie Amann for her thoughts and guidance on this piece. Any errors are solely attributable to the author.

The post THE RIGHTS-BEARING CHILD’S BEST INTERESTS: IMPLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT’S REJECTION OF A CHILD-RETURN ORDER IN X V. LATVIA appeared first on Regent University School of Law.

]]>
Legitimate Persecution: The Effect of Asylum’s Nexus Claim https://jgjpp.regent.edu/legitimate-persecution-the-effect-of-asylums-nexus-claim/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=legitimate-persecution-the-effect-of-asylums-nexus-claim Sun, 18 Aug 2024 03:59:40 +0000 https://jgjpp.regent.edu/?p=623 Nicholas Bolzman* | 1 Regent J. Glob. Just. & Pub. Pol. 3 (2014) Download PDF INTRODUCTION For the past forty years, the United States has suffered from a schizophrenic asylum policy. To obtain asylum, applicants must meet two requirements—that they fear or have experienced actual persecution, and the persecution was on account of one of five listed grounds: race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.[]...

The post Legitimate Persecution: The Effect of Asylum’s Nexus Claim appeared first on Regent University School of Law.

]]>
Nicholas Bolzman* | 1 Regent J. Glob. Just. & Pub. Pol. 3 (2014)

Download PDF

INTRODUCTION

For the past forty years, the United States has suffered from a schizophrenic asylum policy. To obtain asylum, applicants must meet two requirements—that they fear or have experienced actual persecution, and the persecution was on account of one of five listed grounds: race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.[1] While the first requirement is expansive and able to adapt to whatever new creative forms of harsh treatment persecutors develop, the second, called the nexus clause, finitely and arbitrarily narrows and limits asylum to only those who have suffered a type of persecution foreseeable to the statute’s drafters.

Although an improvement to the prior ad hoc and geographically limited criteria for asylum, the internal tensions in today’s asylum law have resulted in both inconsistent results and distracting litigation— both of which harm the very people asylum law is supposed to help. Despite being an attempt to modify the persecution element, the nexus clause, as interpreted by the courts, has become, at best, an unnecessary complication and, at worst, an inadvertent legitimation of the persecution that an asylum law should protect against. The result is a policy that arbitrarily excludes victims of persecution when their persecutor’s motivation is not recognized under the limited nexus clause, a practice that inadvertently declares the persecution legitimate. Examples of such exclusions are victims of persecution based on gender and sexual orientation, those targeted for female genital mutilation (FGM) or recruitment as child soldiers, and those subjected to persecutory laws of general application.

This shortcoming could be addressed by adding gender, age, or laws that violate other basic human rights to the nexus clause list. But this would only be a surface fix. The heart of the difficulty is an inherent conflict written into the asylum law itself. Identifying this conflict makes the solution simpler than creating a laundry list of the various types of persecution that people may face around the world. Instead, the United States can simply offer asylum to those who are persecuted for any illegitimate motivation. This would recast the nexus clause as a classification, instead of an additional criterion, or could even be used to remove the clause altogether.

HISTORY OF THE U.S.’S ASYLUM POLICY

The United States’ asylum policy is historically intertwined with— and is still a subset of—its immigration policy. When immigration rules were lax, there was no need for a separate asylum procedure for refugees to obtain permission to enter the United States. The only time the issue of asylum would come up was in response to extradition procedures when an alien’s home country demanded its citizen back.[2] Refugees were not even given legal recognition until 1948.[3]

From the nation’s founding until 1875, there were virtually no immigration restrictions.[4] Refugees could enter the same as anyone else. Restrictions began in 1875 with prohibitions on prostitutes and criminals,[5]and continued over the next several decades: Chinese immigration was prohibited in 1882,[6] anarchists were excluded in 1903,[7] and illiterates were barred in 1917.[8] The first quotas restricting the number of foreigners allowed to enter the country annually were enacted in 1921, but there were still no affirmative eligibility requirements to meet before entry.[9] During this era, because the immigrants’ reason for seeking entry was simply irrelevant and there was no need to place refugees into a separate class, refugees would be admitted or excluded on the same criteria as any other alien. Yet, with the adoption of quotas, refugees competed with all other types of immigrants. The result, as Fragomen and Bell explain, was that refugees were increasingly squeezed out:

While restrictions on immigration increased, no special provision was made to permit the continuing entry into the United States of persons seeking sanctuary from persecution in their home countries. The result was that the previously open doors were shut completely to refugees; the worst example of this policy came in the 1930s, when Congress refused on several occasions to enact legislative exceptions to the strict quota policy then in effect in order to permit the entry of refugees from Nazi terror, including proposed exceptions for groups of Jewish orphans.[10]

Although likely unintended, the effect of the increasingly restrictive immigration policies adopted in the early twentieth century was to leave out refugees altogether.

It was not until after World War II, in the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, that refugees first received legal recognition.[10] However, it was so highly restrictive and technical that ninety percent of displaced Jews, whom this act was supposed to help, did not qualify.[11] This act was extended in 1950, 1951, and 1952, but remained geographically limited to the countries liberated from German rule.[12]

In 1953, Congress also adopted the Refugee Relief Act, which provided for the admission of 28,000 refugees, half of which needed to be from Eastern European countries.[13] The purpose was largely political: “[s]pecial allotments were provided for Sweden, Iran, and Greece (countries viewed as bulwarks of democracy against Soviet expansionism).”[14] Sponsorship by U.S. citizens was required for all applicants.[15] However, these combined acts, which addressed refugees “on an ad hoc basis . . . while failing to devise an overall policy,”[16] were inadequate for the refugee crisis following the 1956 Hungarian revolution and the subsequent invasion of Hungary by the Soviet Union.[17]

The Hungarian revolution produced approximately 200,000 refugees, and the United States was unable to meet its portion of the demand under the Refugee Relief Act of 1953.[18] Once all refugee slots were full, President Eisenhower, after consulting with Congress, authorized the Attorney General to use the newly created parole power to admit additional 15,000 refugees.[19] This new parole power had been added by the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952.[20] Anker and Posner describe it as follows:

Section 212(d)(5) was originally enacted to authorize the parole of otherwise inadmissible aliens. Derived from early administrative practice and operational instructions, it was designed to overcome some of the stringent entry requirements contained in the INA without allowing the alien the legal protections granted with formal entry into the United States. While both the prior administrative practice and the legislative history of the INA indicate a purpose to benefit individual aliens in emergency situations, the 1956 Hungarian crisis heralded “the first, but by no means the last,” use of the parole provision for the mass admission of refugees.[21]

The parole power was again used to admit refugees from the Cuban revolution of 1959, and then again for Chinese, Czechs, and Indochinese in the 1960s and 1970s.[22] Each time Congress tacitly approved the measure by passing legislation permitting the paroled refugees to adjust their statuses to that of legal permanent resident.[23]

Congress finally created an immigration category for refugees in the 1965 amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act.[24] These amendments also did away with the national quota system and replaced it with the priority system that is the basis for today’s immigration policy.[25] However, most of the refugee restrictions from the prior ad hoc acts were kept.[26] To be eligible for asylum, applicants had to meet four criteria:

1) departure from a communist-dominated country or from a country within the general area of the Middle East; 2) the departure constituted a flight; 3) such flight was caused by persecution or fear of persecution on account of race, religion, or political opinion; and 4) an inability or unwillingness to return.[27]

Because of these geographic and ideological limitations, the act was inadequate to deal with refugees globally, and de facto refugee policy continued to be largely set by the executive branch’s parole power.[28]

Congress eventually adopted today’s refugee policy in the Refugee Act of 1980.[29] This new policy was designed to “remedy the ideological and geographical biases that had infected earlier US refugee policy.”[30] To accomplish this end, it opened up the refugee definition to applicants worldwide, rather than limiting it to certain geographic areas.[31] It also modeled the definition of refugee devised by the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.[32] As Price explains, this act “for the first time created an explicit statutory basis for asylum.”[33] This definition of refugee is still in effect today. But as will be shown, while it eliminated the arbitrary geographic limitations and opened up the ideological restrictions, it still falls short of providing a truly expansive refugee policy.

Continue Reading in the Full PDF


  1. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). ↩
  2. See MATTHEW E. PRICE, RETHINKING ASYLUM: HISTORY, PURPOSE, AND LIMITS 25 (2009). ↩
  3. See AUSTIN T. FRAGOMEN & STEVEN C. BELL, IMMIGRATION PRIMER 194 (1985).   ↩
  4. See id. ↩
  5. See id.; Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 141, §§ 3, 5, 18 Stat. 476, 477. ↩
  6. See FRAGOMEN & BELL, supra note 3, at 194 n. 3; Act of May 6, 1882, ch.126, § 1, 22 Stat. 58, 58–59. ↩
  7. See FRAGOMEN & BELL, supra note 3, at 194; Act of March 3, 1903, ch. 1012, § 2, 32 Stat. 1213, 1214 (repealed 1907). ↩
  8. See FRAGOMEN & BELL, supra note 3, at 195; Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, § 3, 39 Stat. 874, 875 (repealed 1952). ↩
  9. See FRAGOMEN & BELL, supra note 3, at 195; Act of May 29, 1921, ch. 8, § 2, 42 Stat. 5 (repealed 1952). ↩
  10. Id. at 194; Displaced Persons Act of 1948, ch. 647, 62 Stat. 1009. ↩
  11. Deborah E. Anker & Michael H. Posner, The Forty Year Crisis: A Legislative History of the Refugee Act of 1980, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 9, 13 (1981-82). ↩
  12. See FRAGOMEN & BELL, supra note 3, at 195; Anker & Posner, supra note 12, at 13; Act of June 16, 1950, ch. 262, 64 stat. 219; Act of June 28, 1951, ch. 167, 65 Stat. 96; Act of June 27, 1952, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 277. ↩
  13. See BARBARA M. YARNOLD, REFUGEES WITHOUT REFUGE: FORMATION AND FAILED IMPLEMENTATION OF U.S. POLITICAL ASYLUM POLICY IN THE 1980’S 13 (1990); Refugee Relief Act of 1953,,ch. 336, 67 Stat. 400. ↩
  14. Anker & Posner, supra note 12, at 14. ↩
  15. See YARNOLD, supra note 14, at 13. ↩
  16. FRAGOMEN & BELL, supra note 3, at 195. ↩
  17. See Anker & Posner, supra note 12, at 14–15. ↩
  18. See id. at 14–15. ↩
  19. Id. at 15; FRAGOMEN & BELL, supra note 3, at 195–96. ↩
  20. See FRAGOMEN & BELL, supra note 3, at 195–96; 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(12). ↩
  21. Anker & Posner, supra note 12, at 15 (footnotes omitted). ↩
  22. FRAGOMEN & BELL, supra note 3, at 196. ↩
  23. Id. ↩
  24. See Anker & Posner, supra note 12, at 17. ↩
  25. See id. at 18. ↩
  26. Id. at 17. ↩
  27. Id. ↩
  28. See YARNOLD, supra note 14, at 15; Anker & Posner, supra note 12, at 18–19. ↩
  29. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 USC, 20 USC & 22 USC); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). ↩
  30. PRICE, supra note 2, at 86. ↩
  31. See id. ↩
  32. Id.; Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1(2), Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (entered into force Oct. 4, 1967) (removing date cut-off from Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1(A)(2), July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 150). ↩
  33. PRICE, supra note 2, at 86. ↩

*J.D. 2013, Michigan State University College of Law. Special thanks to David and Veronica Thronson for teaching me immigration law and assisting with this article.

The post Legitimate Persecution: The Effect of Asylum’s Nexus Claim appeared first on Regent University School of Law.

]]>